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LABOR LAw-NLRA-"ALLY" DOCTRINE-With the purpose of compel-
ling Roy Construction Co. to stop buying supplies from Roy Lumber Co., 
a non-union supplier which the union had been unsuccessfully trying to 
organize, the union called a strike of the employees of Roy Construction. 
While the two employers were distinct corporate entities, all of the stock 
in both was owned by the five Roy brothers, and the two boards of directors 
were largely identical. The two businesses were parts of a family partner-
ship venture and were engaged in related businesses with Roy Lumber 
supplying Roy Construction's millwork.1 The NLRB issued a complaint 
against the striking union for engaging in an unfair labor practice in 
violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act.2 
On hearing by the NLRB, held, complaint dismissed. The union's effort 
to induce Roy Construction to cease doing business with Roy Lumber 
was not an illegal secondary boycott because the common ownership and 
control and the interrelation of the two businesses make the two em-
ployers "allies." Carpenters Union (J.G. Roy & Sons Co.), ll8 N.L.R.B. No. 
24, 40 L.R.R.M. 1171 (1957). 
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice 
for a union to engage in a strike for the purpose of forcing an em-
ployer "to cease doing business with any other person."3 Although by 
its plain meaning this prohibition would appear to extend to all sec-
ondary boycotts induced by strikes,4 the provision has not been so 
1 A discussion of whether these factual conclusions, reached by a majority of the 
board, are supported by the facts of the case appears infra. 
2 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (b) (4) (A). 
a Note 2 supra. 
4 See 50 MICH. L. REv. 315 at 319 (195-1). See also Curto v. International Longshore-
men's &: W. Union, (D.C. Ore. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 805 at 815, n. 15. 
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construed.5 Instead, the "ally" doctrine has been invoked to limit the 
scope of this section to those cases in which its purpose of protecting in-
nocent third persons will be effectuated.6 Thus, when the secondary em-
ployer is sufficiently related to the primary employer, the "ally" doctrine 
prevents the finding of a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A), the theory being 
that the two employers are in effect but one employer or that they are 
so closely related that they are not "doing business" inter se.7 The doctrine 
springs from a statement by Senator Taft, made during the Senate's pre-
enactment discussion of this provision, that this section would prohibit 
secondary boycotts only against employers which were "wholly uncon-
cerned" with the primary dispute.8 Relying on the Senator's remark, Judge 
Rifkind gave the first judicial expression to the rule in Douds v. Metropol-
itan Federation of Architects, etc.,9 commonly called the Ebasco case. 
There the court found that no unfair fabor practice resulted from picketing 
a secondary employer to whom struck work was being transferred by the 
primary employer. The application of the "ally" doctrine in this type of 
case is based on sound policy, for, as Judge Rifkind notes, if the primary 
employer could freely transfer struck work, the strike against the primary 
employer would be rendered as ineffectual as if the use of strike breakers was 
permitted.10 The "ally" doctrine was first applied by the Board in National 
Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards (Irwin-Lyons) to a situation where 
the two employers were commonly owned and managed and were en-
gaged in "one straight line operation."11 The majority in the principal case 
purport to bring the present case within the rationale of the Irwin-Lyons 
5 Cases on this topic are collected in 16 A.L.R. (2d) 769 at 778 to 781 (1951). 
6 See 64 HARV. L. R.Ev. 781 at 802 (1951). 
7 Principal case; Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, etc., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 
75 F. Supp. 672. See also NLRB v. Wine, Liquor &: Dist. Workers Union, (2d Cir. 1949) 
178 F. (2d) 584 at 587. The Supreme Court :has yet to pass affirmatively on the scope 
of the doctrine. But see note 11 infra. 
s "This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the 
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an 
employer and his employees." 93 CONG. R.Ec. 4198 (1947). By "wholly unconcerned" 
Senator Taft probably meant more precisely, as he stated in a later debate, that the 
third person must not lbe in "cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary employer." 
95 CONG. R.Ec. 8709 (1949). 
9 Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, etc., note 7 supra. 
10 The rationale of the Ebasco case was applied in NLRB v. Intl. Union of Electrical, 
Radio &: Machine Workers, Local 459, (2d Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 553, in allowing the 
union to picket an employer which was accepting struck work from the primary employer. 
1187 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949). The board's concept of "one straight line operation" was 
based on these facts: A cut logs; B transported the logs to A's mill, where A sawed the 
logs. The "ally" doctrine was refused application in the following cases: Labor iBoard 
v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) (general contractor and subcontractor); 
NLRB v. Wine, Liquor&: Dist. Workers Union, note 7 supra (manufacturer and distrib• 
utor); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (National Cement), 115 N.L.R.B. 
1290 (1956) (A was a relative of the partners of B and an employee of B); Electrical Work-
ers v. Labor Board, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Carpenters Union v. Labor Board, 341 U.S. 707 
(1951); Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers &: Helpers (Climax Machinery), 86 N.L.R.B. 1243 
(1949). 
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case, by finding both common o-wnership and control and a "straight line 
operation." Of -these factual conclusions, only the finding of common 
ownership is supportable by the facts. The control of the two businesses 
was vested in separate sets of brothers; they possessed complete authority 
to run their respective businesses, which were operated as entirely separate 
enterprises and managed wholly independently from each other.12 The 
two businesses were not parts of a "straight line operation." They engaged 
merely in ordinary buying and selling, as their own best interests dictated, 
and such buying and selling constituted but a small portion of their 
business operations.13 Consequently, the Board's decision can be said to 
rest solely on common ownership, interlocking directorates and ordinary 
buying and selling.14 On such a basis, the principal case represents a con-
siderable extension of the "ally" doctrine.111 Continued application of the 
principal case would sanction a wide area of secondary activity because 
of the frequency with which two businesses are related by the elements 
forming the basis for the invocation of the "ally" doctrine in the principal 
case. The sound policy of the Ebasco case can have no application in this 
type of case, since common ownership and interlocking directorates, unlike 
the transfer of struck work, cannot diminish the vitality of the union's 
strike against the primary employer. Section 8(b) (4) (A) seeks to promote 
two policies: prevention of injury to persons not associated with a labor 
dispute, and preservation of the union's right to present its claims to the 
employer effectively.16 The principal case sacrifices the first of these policies 
in a case where the second policy was not being undercut. These two pol-
icies would be served best by limiting the "ally" doctrine to cases where 
the association between the primary and secondary employer results in a 
significant impairment of the effectiveness of the union's primary strike.17 
William P. Wooden, S.Ed. 
12 Dissent in the principal case by Member Rodgers, 40 L.R.R.M. 1171 at 1173 (1957). 
In Alpert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., (D.C. Mass. 1956) 143 F. Supp. 371, 
a temporary injunction was granted against the union's activities which were those out 
of which the principal case also grew. The court found the two businesses were managed 
and controlled "without interference, assistance or control" from the other business. 
13 Dissent by Member Rodgers, note 12 supra. In Alpert v. United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters, etc., note 12 supra, the court found that Roy Construction bought millwork 
from Roy Lumber, "but when it could purchase more advantageously elsewhere, it did so." 
14 The board stated that it would -have reached the same result in the principal case, 
even without a finding that there was a "straight line operation." 
15 Previously there had been dicta in accord with such a holding. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (National Cement), note II supra. 
16 See 40 MINN. L. REv. 872 at 876 (1956); Tower, "A Perspective on Secondary Boy-
cotts," 2 LAB. L. J. 727 at 737-739 (1951). 
17 In Alpert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., note 12 supra, the court 
rejected common ownership and control as a basis for this doctrine and stated •that the 
doctrine is limited to cases of transfer of struck work. The case ascribes this meaning 
to "wholly unconcerned": " 'Concerned' means related or connected through activities, 
not through the incident of ownership, or management." Curto v. International Long-
